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arrest." S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 6-7.
The Court found that the already compelling interest in preventing crime is
heightened when the government has convincing proof that the arrestee presents a
demonstrable danger to the community.
"Under these narrow circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its
greatest." United States v. Salerno, 107
S.Ct. 2095 at 2103.
When the government proves by clear
and convincing evidence that an
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the
community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a
court may disable the arrestee from
executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we cannot categorically
state that pretrial detention "offends
some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934).

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2103.
The Court thus concluded there was no
facial violation of substantive due process.
Turning to the facial challenge against
the procedures, the Court stated that "[t]o
sustain [the procedures] against such a
challenge, we need only find them "adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of
at least some persons charged with
crimes." Id. at 2103, quoting Schall v. Afar·
tin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). The Court then
went on to detail the procedures called for
under the Act.
Detainees have the right to counsel, to
testify, present information by proffer or
otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses.
The government has the burden and must
prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Section 3142(F); and the judge must
include written findings. §3142(i). There is
also immediate appellate review. §3245(c).
The Court concluded that the extensive
safeguards were sufficient to repel a facial
challenge against the procedures.
The Court turned finally to respondent's challenge based on the excessive bail
clause of the eighth amendment. The
Court stated that the U[p ]rimary function
of bail is to safeguard the Courts' role in
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of
defendants .... " United States v. Salerno,
107 S.Ct. at 2104. However, the Court
refused to interpret the bail clause in such
a fashion as to make bail available in all circumstances.
The Court stated that, "[Tlhe Eighth
Amendment does not prevent Congress

from defining the classes of cases in which
bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus,
in criminal cases bail is not compulsory
where the punishment may be death.
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be
bailable." United States v. Salerno, 107
S.Ct. at 2105, quoting Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 545-546 (1952).
Thus, the Court expressly empowered
Congress to impose other considerations
other than questions of flight when deciding whether to allow an arrestee out on
bail.
We believe that when Congress has
mandated detention on the basis of a
compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth
Amendment does not require release
on bail.

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2105.
In sum, the Supreme Court has found
that Congress may constitutionally
impose considerations other than flight to
the decision of whether an arrestee is bail
eligible. Where the considerations are
compelling, the Court will defer to the
will of Congress.

-Michael Scott Friedman

Arizona v. Mauro: POllCE ACTIONS
OF WI1NESSING AND
RECORDING A PRE-DETENTION
MEETING DID NOT CONSTITUTE
AN INTERROGATION IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA
In Arizona v. Mauro, - U.S. -, 107
S.Ct. 1931 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court held that an "interrogation" did not result from police actions of
recording and witnessing a predetention
meeting between the accused and his
spouse. In reversing a judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court, the Court decided
that Mauro's invocation of his Miranda
rights did not extend any privilege of confidentiality to remarks made to his wife in
a "private" meeting arranged by police at
the insistence of the defendant's spouse.
After admitting to police that he had
murdered his son, William Carl Mauro
was arrested and advised of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Mauro was twice read
his right to refuse to make any statement
without an attorney present. At Mauro's
request, police interrogation immediately
halted.
Meanwhile in another room at the police

station, Mrs. Mauro was also being questioned concerning the murder of her child.
After questioning, she became adamant in
her demand to meet with her husband.
Although reluctant at first, the police consented to the meeting only on the condition that an officer be present. The Mauros
were not consulted prior to their meeting,
and their brief conversation was recorded
by a tape recorder within their plain view.
During the meeting, Mrs. Mauro expressed
despair, while Mr. Mauro advised her not
to answer any questions until an attorney
was present. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. at 1933.
At trial, the defense put forth an insanity
plea which the prosecution rebutted by
playing back the recorded conversation,
and arguing that the recording showed
Mauro was sane on the day of the murder.
The trial court refused Mauro's motion to
suppress the recording, rejecting the
defense that it was a product of police
interrogation in violation of his Miranda
rights. Mauro was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death, and the present
appeal ensued.
In reversing the trial court decision, the
Arizona Supreme Court found that the
police had interrogated Mauro under
Miranda by allowing him to speak to his
wife in the presence of an officer. Arizona
'0. Mauro, 149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393
(1986). According to the court, the interrogation was invalid because Mauro had
requested counsel before any further questioning. The court based its holding on
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980),
which held that interrogation may include
practices "that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect." Id. at 30t.
Since two police officers had testified during pretrial hearings that they thought it
possible that Mauro might make
incriminating remarks during the meeting
with his spouse, the court found that Innis
applied, and overturned the trial court's
admission of the recorded conversation
into evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed, by a 5 to
4 margin. Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell focused on the issue of whether the
police actions were the "functional equivalent" of interrogation under Innis. In holding that no interrogation occurred, the
Court found that the officer present at the
meeting between the Mauros posed no
questions to the defendant. This had the
effect of rejecting the minority view,
embraced by Justice Stevens, that the
police "employed a powerful psychological ploy" against Mauro. Mauro, 107 S.Ct.
at 1937. Justice Stevens, for the dissent,
argued that the police actions overwhelmed Mauro because they did not pro-
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vide him with an opportunity to refuse to
speak with his wife, or tell him in advance
that police officer would be present and
the conversation recorded. The majority
found no evidence to suggest that the
police had acted to allow the meeting "for
the purpose of eliciting incriminating
statements," Id. at 1936, and upheld the
trial judge's decision to admit the taped
conversation. Indeed, the Court found the
officers acted to discourage the meeting
entirely, and only stipulated to having an
-officer present to ensure the safety of Mrs.

Mauro.Id.
The opinion espoused by the Court in

Mauro narrows the interpretation of Innis
with respect to action by the police in lieu
of direct interrogation of suspects. The
Court now permits the police to obtain by
proxy that which they can not obtain
directly, voluntary self-incriminating statements made in the course of a predetention meeting between an accused and '
a spouse. Such statements may now be
used against a defendant at trial~ despite
police orchestration of and participation in
any such meeting, and notwithstanding
the defendant's prior assertion of his
Miranda rights under the fifth amendment.

- Mark Brugh
Maryland v. Garrison: GOOD-FAITH
MISTAKE IN VALID BUT
OVERBROAD SEARCH WARRANT
DOES NOT INVAUDATE SEARCH
As a result of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Maryland 'D. Garrison,
U.S. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987), the Rehnquist
Court has carved, yet, another good-faith
exception to the warrant requirement. In
Garrison, the Court held that' a factual mistake made in good-faith by police officers
did not invalidate a broader than appropriate Search warrant or its accompanying
search. The search, the Court explained,
was only limited by the police officers' discovery of their factual mistake.
In Garrison, "Baltimore police officers
obtained and executed a warrant to search
the person of Lawrence McWebb and the
premises known as 2036 Park Avenue
third floor apartment." Id. at 1014. The
search was for controlled substances and
related paraphernalia.
At the time the police obtained the warrant and began their search they were of
the belief that only one apartment existed
on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue.
Information was obtained from an informant that McWebb was selling marijuana
from this third floor apartment. A telephone call to the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company confirmed that there was
32-The Law Forum/Fal~ 1987

one apartment situated on the third floor,
thereby corroborating the police officers'
belief. Although the police inspected the
outside of the seven unit building, the
building was not approached until the warrant was executed. The third floor, which
had a common doorway and vestibule, was
divided into two separate units - one
belonging to McWebb and the other to
respondent, Garrison. Before the police
officers became aware of their mistake,
they searched' Garrison's apartment and
seized contraband in violation of
Maryland's Controlled Substances Act.
Md. Ann. Code art. 27 §276 (1957).
A Maryland trial court denied Garrison's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. Id.
58 Md. App. 417, 473, A.2d 514 (1984).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed. 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d 193 (1985).
In a 6-3 decision, the United States
Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, divided the case
into two constitutional issues. The first
considered the validity of the warrant and
the second, the reasonableness of the way
the police officers executed the warrant.
As to the validity of the warrant, "[t]he
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance
of any warrant except one particularly
describing the place to be search and the
person's or things to be seized." Id. at
1017. Because Garrison made no claim that
the warrant did not adequately describe
"the persons or things to be seized" or
that there was no probable cause to believe
that they might be in "the place to be searched" as specified in the warrant, the
Court held that this Fourth Amendment
particularity-of-description requirement
was met. The issue, Stevens said, becomes
"whether that factual mistake (i.e., believing only McWebb's apartment existed on
the third floor) iqvalidated a warrant that
undoubtedly would have been valid if it
had reflected a completely accurate
understanding of the building's floor
plan." Id.
This issue, Stevens continued, turns on
the constitutionality of the police officers'
"conduct in light of the information
available to them at the time they acted."
Id. The majority found that the police officers reasonable believed, based on the
information they had gathered, that only
McWebb's apartment occupied the third
floor. Thus, the Court concluded, "the
warrant, insofar as it authorized a search
that turned out ambiguous in scope, was
valid when it issued." Id. at 1018.
Next, the Court addressed the
reasonableness of the way in which the

police officers executed the warrant. The
majority stated that the police had gained
access to the third floor common area
legally; "they carried a search warrant and
they were accompanied by McWebb who
provided the key to the third floor." Id. at
1018. Thus, the Court only considered the
police officers' conduct in executing the
warrant once they entered the third floor
common area.
The majority stated that the police officers were required to discontinue the search of Garrison's apartment once they
discovered or should have discovered that
the third floor contained two apartments
instead of the assumed one. However, "the
Court has also recognized the need to
allow some latitude for honest mistakes
that are made by officers in the dangerous
and difficult process of making arrests and
executing search warrants." Id. at 1018.
Citing HiD 'D. California, 401 U.s. 797
(1971), for the proposition that honest mistakes in arrests obviate' Fourth Amendment concerns, the majority held that "the
officers' conduct was consistent with a
reasonable effort to ascertain and identify
the place intended to be searched within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. at 1019. Before their discovery of the
factual mistake, the majority stated the
officers understandably and reasonably
believed that "McWebb's apartment and
the third-floor premises as one and the
same." Id. 'The execution of the warrant,
the majority held, reasonably included the
entire third floor and consequently, the
contraband found on that floor was properly admissible.
Justice Blackmun, along the Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented. A person,
Blackmun opined, has the highest expectation of privacy in his home, whether it be
a mobile home, a unit in a multipleoccupancy dwelling, or the most majestic
mansion. Indeed, "the physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed." Id. at 1020. (Blackmum, J. dissenting) Therefore, absent one of the warrant requirement exceptions as stated in
Coolidge 'D. New Hampshsire, 403 U.S. 443,
478 (1971), a warrantless search of a home
is presumptively unreasonable.
In concluding, that the search of Garrison's apartment was warrantless and therefore improper, the dissent did not believe
the particularity-of-description requirement of the search warrant was met. This
particularity requirement applies with
equal force to multi-unit buildings as to
individual private homes, requiring that
the targeted unit be described with enough
specificity to prevent a search of all units.
Garrison at 107 S.Ct. 1021. When applying

